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THE ANTHRACITE COAL PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN
On January 29, 1940, by the agreement of Governor James of Penn-
sylvania, the United Mine Workers of America and industry representa-
tives, the Anthracite Coal Production Control Plan came into effect; 1 on
July 7, 1941, the Plan was given legislative approval by way of an amend-
ment to the Commerce Law of Pennsylvania.2 This plan is still in opera-
tion. By setting production quotas for those anthracite companies which
have chosen to cooperate, the Plan succeeded in improving the financial
status of the industry after a decade of economic chaos resulting from
competition from other fuels and cutthroat price competition within the
anthracite industry itself.Y
That it has played a part in preserving the industry may be a strong
recommendation for the Plan. However, there is some doubt as to the
economic and legal soundness of the adopted approach. The Plan has
resulted in a limitation of anthracite coal production since 1940, with the
exception of the years- 1942 to 1948 when wartime conditions called for
unlimited production. The decline in production has been accompanied
by declining sales and rising prices. In addition, the employment of pro-
duction controls in an industry engaged in interstate commerce raises two
substantial legal problems: is this action a combination in restraint of trade
or an attempt to create a monopoly, violative of the Sherman Antitrust
Act; 4 or, does the Plan constitute action by the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania which conflicts with the federal commerce power and is prohibited
by the commerce clause of the Constitution? In order to evaluate the Plan
in the light of these problems, it is necessary to make a case study of a
declining industry, a detailed examination of the operation of the attempted
solution, and an evaluation of possible alternative solutions.
1. PA. DEPT OF CoMMERcE, PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN FOR THE ANTHRACITE
INDusTRY (Jan. 29, 1940) (Hereinafter cited as Anthracite Production Control
Plan).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1709-3 (Purdon 1942).
3. Since almost 95% of known deposits of anthracite in the United States are
located in Pennsylvania, it was to that State that the industry turned for aid.
RAILRoAD Commxrrmr, ANTHRACITE COAL 29 (1945). See WILCOX, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY 179 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1941).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946).
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TABLE I
PRODUCTION OF ANTHRACITE COAL IN TONS t
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1915
1917
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
46,468,641
57,997,337
57,367,915
77,659,850
84,485,236
88,995,061
99,611,811
89,598,249
90,473,451
54,683,022
93,339,009
87,926,862
61,817,149
84,437,452
80,095,564
75,348,069
73,828,195
69,384,837
59,645,652
49,855,221
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952*
t from Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook 350, 351 (1950) and Anthracite
Institute, Manual of Statistical Information Table 1 (1953).
* preliminary.
HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS AT ANTHRACITE STABILIZATION
Table I illustrates that although from 1830 to 1917 anthracite produc-
tion generally increased in the typical pattern of American industry, since
1917 production has been in a period of decline. This situation stems
mainly from competition from other fuels, but partly from high prices result-
ing from successive monopolistic practices within the industry. The history
of the industry shows a pattern of events which has led operators to attempt
various methods of controlling intra-industry competition.
An early use of monopolistic devices occurred when eight railroads
controlled the eight major mining companies; this railroad-coal mining
combination was advantageous since transportation of coal from mine to
tidewater is an important and costly factor in the coal industry.5 In 1895
5. WiLcox, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 179-80 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1941).
1954]
49,541,344
57,168,291
52,158,783
54,579,535
51,856,433
46,099,027
51,487,377
51,484,640
56,368,267
60,327,729
60,643,620
63,701,363
54,933,909
60,506,873
57,190,009
57,139,948
42,701,724 r excludes Sullivan
44,076,703 ] County which usu-
42,079,667 ally produces less
t than 1,000,000
tons.
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these anthracite "line companies" owned 95% of the available holdings.
Pooling agreements, price leadership and market sharing were the chief
methods of avoiding competition.6 Six of the line companies, which then
produced about 75% of the annual output, were convicted in 1912 of re-
straint of trade by preventing the construction of a new railroad to service
the independent companies and by signing identical contracts for the pur-
chase of all the independent production in order to prevent its affecting
the price of coal.
7
During World War I demand far exceeded supply. Production was
increased over 10 million tons from 1916 to 1917. In addition, an allot-
ment plan was devised which actually cut shipments to the central and
western states.8 Later, the postwar decrease in demand resulted in a
capacity to produce more than the market required. The slighted markets
in the central and western states were never fully regained from the in-
roads of bituminous coal; simultaneously, anthracite was being replaced
as a railroad fuel. 9
In 1920 the Supreme Court compelled the divorce of the Philadelphia
& Reading Coal and Iron Company, the Philadelphia and Reading Railway
Company, and the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey; 10 the three
had been owned by the Reading Company, a holding company which had
been the price leader in the industry since 1902.11 The Court commented
that ". . . this dominating power was not obtained by normal expansion
to meet the demands of a business growing as a result of superior and
enterprising management, but by deliberate, calculated purchase for con-
trol." 12 Shortly thereafter the other line companies with one exception
were voluntarily divorced from the railroad companies.
In the winters of 1922-3 and 1925-6 severe strikes cut all shipments
and again the western states suffered most.13 It was at this time that
petroleum consumption increased and natural gas first made real progress
as a heating fuel, both at the expense of anthracite coal.14 Table II shows
that these inroads continued during the thirties and forties. Not only did
the other fuels increase their markets at the expense of possible anthracite
expansion, but they also made inroads on the existing anthracite market,
causing a net decline in anthracite production.
6. Ibid.
7. United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912).
8. MEAD, ANALYsis OF THE DECLINE OF THE ANTHRACITE INDUSTRY 37-4D
(1935).
9. Ibid.
10. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920). The convictions were
under the Hepburn Act, 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1946) and sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946).
11. BURNs, DECLINE OF COMPETITION 118 (1936).
12. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920).
13. MEAD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 40-1.
14. Id. at 56 et seq.
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TABLE II
ANNUAL SUPPLY OF ENERGY FROM MINERAL FUELS AND WATER POWER
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1950, IN TRILLIONS OF B.T.U.
Natural Bitum. Pa.
Year Gas Coal Petroleum Anth. Water Total
1900 254 5563 369 1457 250 7893
1910 547 10928 1218 2146 539 15378
1920 858 14899 3185 2276 738 21956
1930 2089 12249 5568 1762 752 22420
1935 2060 9756 5967 1325 806 19914
1940 2860 12072 8096 1308 880 25216
1945 4213 15134 10368 1395 1442 32552
1950 6583 13414 12440 1128 1572 35137
from American Gas Association, Gas Facts 28 (1950).
Anthracite market losses have been mostly in the field of domestic heating,
which in 1951 consumed 56.6% of anthracite production.' 5 In domestic
use the greater convenience of gas and oil is their chief selling characteristic
since their prices are generally higher than anthracite.16
The production decline in the 1930's was, of course, aggravated by the
general depression. Nevertheless, from 1929 to 1933 anthracite did not
decrease in price as much as did the index of all wholesale prices.Y7 About
1936, however, a period of cutthroat competition began. 18 As the market
15. For example, from 1942 to 1952 the production of sizes for domestic use
declined 16 million tons while steam sizes for industrial use declined only 4 million
tons. ANTHRACITE INSTITUTE, MANUAL OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION, Table 7
(1953). Within the principal anthracite markets of New England and the Middle
Atlantic States the consumption of anthracite from 1947 to 1950 decreased from 44
to 33 million tons while the consumption of oil in the same region in coal equivalents
(4 barrels of oil to 1 ton of coal) increased from 44 to 53 million tons. MINERALS
YEARBooK, 1950, 375 (1953).
16. Comparison of prices is an unsatisfactory procedure at best, but some indica-
tions may be given. Granting coal its most efficient conversion value of 13,500 BTU
per pound, considering gas at 700 BTU per cubic foot (Philadelphia Gas Works,
1952-53), and considering oil at 138,500 BTU per gallon, coal costs $.88, oil $.93,
and gas $1.33 per one million BTU at prices in Philadelphia during the winter of
1952-53. The price of coal is on chestnut size, but the conversion equivalent is not
adjusted for the inefficiencies of the conventional hand-fired furnace in which that size
coal is used. The price for gas may be substantially reduced in a home which uses
a great quantity in all of its appliances but it would not reach $.90 per million BTU.
It has been said that the "only weapon which anthracite can use to answer the
question of convenience is the promotion of the sale of the domestic stoker." MEAD,
ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE OF THE ANTHRACITE INDUSTRY 117 (1935). However,
stoker sales are generally decreasing. 12 FUEL OIL AND OIL HEAT 60 (Jan. 1953).
17. BURNS, DECLINE OF CoMp-rnioN 189 (1936); Wn~cox, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY 181 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1941); MEAD, ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE OF
THE ANTHRACITE INDUSTRY 87 (1935).
18. See LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION Co., 1936 ANNUAL REPORT 21, 1938
ANNUAL REPORT 23; LEHIGH VALLEY COAL Co., 1937 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 1939
ANNUAL REPORT 2; GLEN ALDEN COAL Co., 1938 ANNUAL REPORT 4, 1939 ANNUAL
REPORT 2; PHILADELPHIA AND READING COAL AND IRON Co., 1939 ANNUAL REPORT
10.
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diminished more and more the competition for that market among anthracite
companies increased. The results were severe price slashing and great
losses to the individual companies. The decrease in demand during the
depression, the overcapacity from boom times and the increased price
competition combined to affect adversely the income and working capital
of the industry, as illustrated in Table III.
TABLE III
NET INCOME AND WORKING CAPITAL OF COMPANIES ACCOUNTING FOR
APPROXIMATELY 90% OF ANTHRACITE PRODUCTION 1926-40,
IN MILLIONS
Year Net Inc. Wkng. Cap. Year Net Inc. Wkng. Cap.
1926 33.8 111.1 1933 - 8.6 16.5
1927 13.8 99.8 1934 - 1.7 16.3
1928 15.1 89.5 1935 -10.2 8.9
1929 15.2 69.9 1936 - 2.4 - 4.6
1930 13.4 44.2 1937 -17.4 -10.8
1931 - 8.6 33.0 1938 -14.8 -27.0
1932 -10.5 22.7 1939 -14.9 -15.7
1940 - .5 -10.6
from Hearing before Committee on Banking and Currency on Eco-
nomic Power of Labor Organizations, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 259
(1949).
An industry which had a net income of almost $14 million and a work-
ing capital of almost $100- million in 1927, lost $17 million and its current
liabilities exceeded current assets by almost $11 million in 1937. In the
summers of 1938 1 and 1939,20 in the midst of price wars, costs of produc-
tion exceeded selling prices for the whole industry. Not only were the
companies hard hit but the entire coal region was crippled. Employment
which had a peak of 156,000 in 1917 2 dropped to 102,000 in 1936, 96,000
in 1938, and 91,000 in 1940.22 From 1936 to 1940 the average work week
was a little more than 32 days.
23
Conditions causing such havoc to operators and miners alike presented
a problem which was approached in two ways: by cooperation among the
various producing companies and by introduction of legislation in the Penn-
sylvania legislature. An Anthracite Coal Industry Commission was created
by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and it reported in 1937 that a once
rich industry had neglected to compete with other fuels, concentrating in-
19. GLEN ALDEN COAL Co., 1938 ANNUAL REPORT 4, 1939 ANNUAL REPORT 2.
20. LEHIGH VALLEY COAL Co., 1939 ANNUAL REPORT 2; 24 PA. LEGIs. J. 4497
(1941).
21. Hard Times in Hard Coal Country, Business Week, Mar. 22, 1952, p. 108.
22. 53 MONTHLY LABOR R VIEW 618 (1941).
23. Ibid.
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stead on squeezing every penny from the consumer. The Commission
recommended government regulation of some kind.2 4 The larger bitu-
minous industry had been put under federal regulation, but the anthracite
industry did not want government regulation. It failed to agree on a code
of fair competition under the N.R.A.26 During an extraordinary session
of the Pennsylvania legislature called in 1938, four bills 2 were introduced
providing for regulation of production, minimum and maximum prices,
marketing, and for the acquisition of coal lands by the state so that it might
mine and sell coal. These bills were attacked and successfully bottled up
in committee by the industry.
28
Meanwhile, in 1935, and again in 1938, the industry set up a price filing
system whereby each company published its prices for the benefit of the
rest of the companies, but both times the plan failed to aid the industry
because the companies continually sold below published prices.29 By 1939
the larger companies desired production control to eliminate the over-
supplies which caused destructive price cutting. With the cooperation of
Governor James, a temporary production control plan was established on
March 4, 1939,30 but it was *abandoned when a bill to make it permanent
and compulsory was defeated by a tie vote of 24-24 in the state Senate on
May 27, 1939,81 despite the facts that it did not set maximum prices and
that companies representing 80% of the production favored it.32 It was
presented as an "effort to stabilize the industry and to help anthracite . . .
in meeting its real problem of external competition." 8 3 Many independents
were among those who opposed the measure on the grounds that it favored
the line companies, that it was an attempt at monopoly and price fixing,
that it did not aid the consumer and that anthracite was not different from
any other depressed industry. Two line companies also opposed the bill
on the basis that all voluntary methods of control had not been exhausted.
3 4
Private attempts to stabilize prices brought on a federal anti-trust
prosecution against 28 corporations for fixing and agreeing to maintain
prices from 1938 to 1942. The defendants pleaded nolo contendere and
escaped with minor fines, Judge Knox commenting, "Indeed if the detri-
24. Report of the Anthracite Coal Industry Commission, 21 PA. LEGIS. 3. 7916-9
(1937).
25. 49 STAT. 991 (1935) (Guffey Coal Act); 50 STAT. 72 (1937) (Bituminous
Coal Act of 1937) ; see Rostow, Bituminous Coal and the Public Interest, 50 YALE
LJ. 543 (1941); Hamilton, Coal and the Economy-A Demurrer, 50 id. at 595;
Rostow, Joinder in Demurrer, 50 id. at 613.
26. Hearings before subcommittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1417, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (1935).
27. H. Bills 43-6, 22 PA. LEGIS. J. 148 (1938).
28. GLEN ALDEN CoAL Co., 1938 ANNUAL REPORT 2; 22 PA. LEGIS. J. 316
(1938).
29. GLEN ALDEN COAL Co., 1938 ANNUAL REoRT 1; LEHIGH COAL AND NAVI-
GATION Co., 1936 ANNuAL REPORT 21.
30. GLEN ALDEN CoAL Co., 1939 ANNUAL REPORT 1-2; 23 PA. LEois. J. 4836
(1939).
31. H. Bill 1221, 23 PA. LEGIS. J. 1326, 4842 (1939).
32. Id. at 1326, 4831.
33. Id. at 4831.
34. Id. at 3503, 4840, 4841, 4828, 4833, 4834, 4830, 4842.
1954]
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ment that has come to the public were to be balanced against the advantages
it has received, one might plausibly argue that the defendants, instead of
being evil-minded malefactors, were animated by worthy motives, and
accomplished good ends." 35
After another summer of severe competition in 1939 during which,
according to the industry, production capacity was 50% greater than that
required to meet market demand,3 the present Plan was originated. Indus-
try representatives adopted some of the provisions of the 1939 bill and calcu-
lated for each cooperating company in the industry a percentage of the total
anthracite output, based on the company's historical record of production.
This series of percentages became Schedule A of the Plan. Reportedly, as
much as 99% of the producing capacity of the industry agreed to the Plan
at its inception 7  The Plan was then presented to the Committee of
Twelve, an industry-union arbitration group. The United Mine Workers,
represented by John L. Lewis and Philip Murray, duly signed because of
an interest in a healthy industry and in order to secure better wages and
working conditions; 38 the operators, having originated the plan, of course
signed. Governor James, who had agreed on condition that the union sign,
approved the plan on January 23, 1940, and it went into effect six days
later. In 1941 it was felt necessary to obtain legislative approval. In
reporting to the legislature what the Plan had accomplished so far, Repre-
sentative Schwab said:
"This program, a voluntary one, has brought about a marked
degree of stability within the industry. Producers have been able to
meet current tax liabilities and to pay off overdue obligations. Em-
ployment has been stabilized and is showing a marked increase.
"All interested parties are wholeheartedly in accord with this
voluntary program and they now wish to have the Legislature approve
in a formal way what they have been doing informally since January
of 1940." 39
Two years and a fait accompli had worked a great change in attitude.
Not a voice was raised against the program as it passed the House 199-0 40
and the Senate 45-0.41 The sole opposition was a lonely telegram of
protest.
42
35. United States v. Glen Alden Coal Co., Criminal No. 113-391, S.D.N.Y.
(pleas of nolo contendere entered May 2, 1944).
36 25 PA. LEGIS. J. 4059 (1941). As to "demand" see text preceding note
62 infra.
37. 46 CoAL AGE 44 (Feb. 1941).
38. 25 PA. LEGIs. J. 4498 (1941).
39. Id. at 4059. Some of Mr. Schwab's assertions in 1941 can be checked against
the record. The Anthracite Committee's report to the 1953 session of the legislature
claims to have maintained "stability" in the face of severe conditions. The year after
the Plan went into effect, 1940, three of the four line companies whose records are
available had profits for the first time in several years. See text at note 72 et seq.
infra.
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 4498.
42. Id. at 4014.
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THE PLAN
The Plan is a document separate from and temporally prior to the
statute authorizing it 43 and consists of six subdivided articles subscribed
to by operators and the United Mine Workers. In 1941 it was adopted
under the statute and promulgated by the Department of Commerce as a
Production Control Plan for the Anthracite Industry. It is administered
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1709-3 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
"Section 3. The Department of Commerce shall have the power, and its duty
shall be:
"(12) (a) To promulgate a 'Production Control' plan or plans, or amendments
thereof, upon written petition, and with the approval of Pennsylvania producers of
seventy-five per centum of the Pennsylvania output of any United States mineral
resource industry located preponderantly within the Commonwealth, or to adopt and
promulgate any such plan or plans in operation at the time of the enactment of this
act with the sanction of the Pennsylvania producers of seventy-five per centum of
the Pennsylvania output of such industry, and to administer or secure the cooperation
of others, including State officers, producers' representatives or employees' repre-
sentatives in any industry where there are general collective bargaining arrange-
ments, in administering such plan or plans or amendments thereof upon a voluntary
basis: Provided, however, that no production control plan or rules or regulations
relating thereto shall apply to producers who are not petitioning producers or who
do not otherwise assent to the production control plan promulgated and adopted.
"(b) A 'Production Control' within the meaning of this act is any system of
regulated production in any industry as above defined which currently controls the
daily, weekly or monthly volume of allowable production of said industry in Penn-
sylvania. for the purpose of adequately supplying market demand, avoiding waste
of mineral resources or the exploitation thereof without adequate return to the
Commonwealth, her political subdivisions and people, protecting capital invested
therein from unwise depletion and dissipation, promoting employment and security
for the payment of wages and benefits to those employed in such industry and
achieving other express purposes of the Commerce Law (1) by allocating or ap-
portioning to each producer in the indutry a fair and equitable distributive portion
of the total allowable production; (2) by providing for the adjustment of inequities
in assigned distributive portions and for fair and equitable adjustments of distributive
portions whenever transfers of mineral properties or facilities take place between
or among producers based upon the position in the industry fairly and equitably
attributable to such properties or facilities; (3) by providing for the admission
under such plan of new operations and for the assignment of a fair and equitable
distributive portion of the total allowable production to such operations; (4) [deals
with standards of quality] (5) and also by establishing and providing for reasonable
rules and regulations to effectuate such control plan.
"(c) [Deals with inspection for standards of quality]
"(d) [provides for compilation of statistics]
"(e) The department or agency administering any such production control plan,
including the Production Control Plan for the Anthracite Industry heretofore
promulgated and now functioning under the provisions of this act, shall make a
report to each regular session of the General Assembly, showing, inter alia, the
percentage of the output of the industry under such plan and the experience of the
industry thereunder, and shall include therein any recommendations such agency
may have with respect to further legislation which will be helpful in carrying out
the purposes of this act.
"(f) No production control plan promulgated by the department under the
authority of this act shall be continued, whenever the department, if it administers
the plan, or the officers of the State, or a majority of such officers administering
or assisting in the administration of any such plan, shall report to the Governor, and
the Governor shall find that such plan no longer accomplishes the purposes of this
act or no longer is in the public interest."
The Anthracite Committee also administers the Anthracite Standards Law, Sec-
tion 3(12) (b)4 and Section 3(12) (c) of the same act, but that is beyond the scope
of this study.
1954]
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at the expense of the subscribing operators who pay in proportion to their
companies' ratings on Schedule A,4 and it "may be amended in writing by
producers whose aggregate percentages under Schedule A total not less
than 75%, with the approval of the Governor and the Anthracite Com-
mittee, excepting that Schedule A may be modified only as expressly
provided herein." 45 One of the most legally significant features of the
Plan is that it is entirely voluntary in nature both for the operators and
for the state. Any operator may refuse to cooperate, and the Governor
may abolish the whole plan on recommendation of the Department of Com-
merce or the officers of the state who participate in the Plan, if the Gov-
ernor finds the Plan no longer to be in the public interest.
46
Each Monday the Anthracite Producers' Advisory Board meets in
New York City.47 This Board consists of fourteen sales managers, vice-
presidents in charge of sales, and presidents of operating companies. They
were elected by a meeting of all the cooperating producers for the life of
the Plan or until successors are elected, seven being elected by a plurality
vote of all producers and seven by votes weighted according to the tonnage
ratings on Schedule A. A majority of the Board constitutes a quorum and
a majority of any quorum may act. The official function of the Board
is to "advise and make recommendations to the Executive Committee [of
the Anthracite Committee] in respect to all matters covered by this Plan,"
including "advice and recommendations on production as related to prospec-
tive market requirements." 48 The actual function of the Board is to
recommend the amount of production for the following week. Each week
the cooperating producers are required to report to the Producers' Board
and to the Anthracite Committee so as to reach both groups by Monday
morning with figures showing production, sales, and inventory of the previ-
ous week as of Saturday noon. On the basis of orders and the weather
(temperature) a prediction of demand for the entire industry, including
non-cooperating producers, is made. This is corrected by inventories of
unsold and stored coal wherever located and by taking into account the
previous week's error in prediction. The resulting figure is then tele-
phoned to the Anthracite Committee in Harrisburg.
The Anthracite Committee meets weekly in Harrisburg, also on Mon-
days. It consists of nine members, three each from state, operators and
union: The Secretary of Commerce (Andrew J. Sordoni) as chairman;
The Secretary of Mines (William J. Clements) as vice-chairman; and
seven others appointed by the Governor, one a state officer (Randolph C.
Ryder, Deputy Attorney General), three from a panel submitted by the
cooperating producers (the presidents of Philadelphia and Reading Coal
and Iron Co. [13.4% of industry tonnage], Middle Eastern Coal Co.
44. ANTHRACITE PRODucrION CONTROL PLAN art. VII (B).
45. Id. art. VII (C).
46. See note 43 miPra.
47. Much of the information which follows was obtained by personal interview
with persons involved in the origination and operation of the Plan.
48. ANTHRACITE PRODUCrION CONTROL PLAN art II (C).
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[0.2%], and Glen Alden Coal Co. [14.1%o]), and three from a panel sub-
mitted by the United Mine Workers Association (the presidents of the
three district locals) .4 9  Seven members constitute a quorum and any
action requires the approval of seven members. 0 Thus each of the three
groups has a veto power, a right which for the state is the most important
aspect of its control. The Committee is not a body for the arbitration of
conflicting interests; in actual practice all decisions reached are made by
unanimous vote. All three groups are interested in predicting demand, and
each of the nine members is valuable only for his personal ability so to
predict.
The actual function of the Committee is to set a production require-
ments figure for the whole industry. It has before it the same data as the
Producers' Advisory Board (the prior week's production and present un-
sold inventory), in addition to the producers' estimate as to production
requirements. The Committee changes the producers' figure about half
of the time and its decision is always final.
When the Committee has set the "production requirements" for the
week, the estimated production of the non-cooperating producers not on
Schedule A 51 is subtracted; the remainder is then apportioned to each
producer on Schedule A according to his percentage position. Those non-
cooperating producers who at one time were cooperators in the Plan have
their percentage positions maintained on Schedule A. Each cooperating
producer is then sent the figure for the industry as a whole and his in-
dividual proportion.52  The non-cooperating producers, of course, reap
the greatest benefits from the Plan, but they produce only about 15% of
the coal.5 3 Of th& 15%, 10.09% is produced by those not on Schedule A.
54
Schedule A is the list of historical percentages of production reached
by analysis of a base period before institution of the Control Plan. Since
the capacity of many companies has decreased since Schedule A was drawn
up, some companies do not reach their quotas. Although this may be
compensated for in the following week for the industry as a whole, a new
schedule, B, is being drawn up to reflect production capacity more ac-
curately. When in any particular week a producer does not reach his
quota, he may not in succeeding weeks make it up unless the loss was the
49. The Governor has the power to remove any member "for inability to act for
any reason, inefficiency, neglect of duty or misconduct in office" ANTHRACITE
PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN art. I (C).
50. Provision is made for an Executive Committee composed of the Secretary
of Commerce (or the Secretary of Mines if delegated by the former), a producer,
and a union representative. ANTHRACITE PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN art. I (D).
51. About 85% of the anthracite producers are cooperating with the Plan today.
The production of the other 15% does not change significantly and is reported to the
Anthracite Committee monthly.
52. ANTHRACITE PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN art. III (A).
53. This information was obtained in a personal interview with Mr. D. L.
Corgan, Secretary of the Anthracite Committee.
54. ANTHRACITE COMMITTEE, COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION OF ANTHRACITE BY COM-
PANIES (1951).
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non-negligent result of one of certain enumerated causes and the Executive
Committee approves the succeeding increase.55
A report must be made by the Committee to every regular session of
the Pennsylvania General Assembly.56 The report of July 25, 1951 57 in-
dicated that a fall in demand had caused the industry to discontinue the
unlimited production which had been allowed from 1942 to 1948. Large
inventories protected the public against any sudden turn in the weather
which would have created a sudden demand. Price stability was main-
tained when capacity was far greater than demand. The 1953 report"
indicates some lack of cooperation because of dissatisfaction with Schedule
A, but also indicates that Schedule B is being worked on. A great loss of
business in the past two years, especially to oil and gas, is reported.
Although the purpose of the Plan is to set production according to
demand, neither the statute nor the Plan confines the delegated authority
to that purpose. The statute authorizes a "Production Control" plan and
defines it as "any system of regulated production . . . for the purpose of
adequately supplying market demand, avoiding waste of mineral resources
• . .protecting capital from unwise depletion and dissipation, promoting
employment and security for the payment of wages and benefits. . . ." 9
The first enumerated purpose, that of adequately supplying demand, may
very well be in conflict, particularly in a declining industry, with the third
and fourth purposes, those of protecting invested capital and promoting the
welfare of the workers. Adequately supplying demand may require higher
production while protection of capital (operators) and the workers (union)
may require lower production to stabilize the industry further. When such
a conflict occurs it is the duty of the regulatory body, *¢hich in this case
is the Anthracite Committee, to make the choice.
The Production Control Plan is also vague in its definitions of the
delegated authority. The stated duty of the Anthracite Committee is "to
administer the Production Control Plan herein provided for, in accordance
with its intent and purposes." 60 Presumably the intent and purposes
referred to are those in the statute. The duties of the Producers' Ad-
visory Board are to "advise and make recommendations to the Executive
Committee in respect to all matters covered by this Plan." Further on it
is suggested that the Board should make recommendations of production
"as related to" market requirements."' This is not worded as a strict
55. ANTHRACITE PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN art. V (I), (J). (Causes are:
local strikes, fire, flood, explosion, squeeze, machinery breakdown, electrical break-
down, and shortage of railroad cars.)
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1709-3(12) (e) (Purdon Supp. 1952).
57. ANTHRACITE COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF COMMON-
WEALTH OF PA. (July 25, 1951).
58. ANTHRACITE COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF COMMON-
WEALTH OF PA. (June 18, 1953). This is the latest report.
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1709-3(12) (b) (Purdon Supp. 1952).
60. ANTHRACITE PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN art. I (D).
61. Id. art. II(C). "In respect to advice and recommendations on production
as related to prospective market requirements, the Board shall take into considera-
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requirement, nor is the phrase "as related to" capable of any confined
definition. Conceivably the Committee could set production far below
demand in order to protect capital and labor as long as the difference was
not so great as to be "unrelated" to demand. As far as may be ascertained
the Committee and Board do confine themselves to setting production at
the level of demand less excess inventory. The level of demand, however,
is determined by the price at which the coal is being sold. As a result, the
production figure will serve to maintain the existing price level. Thus
production control is really a form of price control.
The weekly calculations are not open to public examination, nor are
any specific findings reported.6 2 Under such circumstances, it is possible
for the regulatory body to do much as it pleases, particularly in light of
its broad delegated authority. It may also be noted that since the controls
are voluntary it is necessary to obtain the consent of the industry in order
to make any changes in the regulation of the industry.0 Potentially, this
is counterbalanced by the power of the Governor to abolish the whole
program in the public interest.
64
The present law gives the industry much greater freedom than the
bills introduced in 1938 65 which would have set prices and introduced the
state as a competitor of private enterprise; it gives even greater freedom
than the 1939 bill 6 6 which proposed a salaried three-man commission en-
tirely independent of the operators, required licensing of all operators and
denial of licenses to financially unsound new operations, and fixed produc-
tion in a manner similar to the present law to maintain a reasonable balance
between production and demand. That plan was mandatory, enforced by
fines, and expired in four years. Neither the 1939 bill nor the present
Plan takes price into official consideration.
EFFECT OF THE PLAN ON PRICES, PROFITS, AND COSTS
The purpose and effect of the Plan is to raise prices by decreasing
the available supply which will compete for the demand. That is the pur-
pose of all efforts at stabilization in the face of cutthroat competition. High
cost producers who would be bankrupted by the uncontrolled operation of
competition are enabled to stay in business by the higher prices charged
to the consumer. Senator Watkins in praising the plan during its con-
sideration by the legislature stated that companies which bad been operating
tion inventories of unsold anthracite in cars at mines or other points designated
for such purposes by railroad companies, at tidewater piers and lake ports, en route
to piers or ports, and anthracite in storage, wherever located."
62. Compare the California Agricultural Prorate Act, CAL. GEN. LAws act
143a (Deering 1944), to be discussed infra. Section 7 of that act provides: "A full
and accurate record of business or acts performed or of testimony taken in pursuance
of the provisions of this act shall be kept and be placed on file in the office of the
director, which records shall at all times be open to any interested person"
63. ANTHRACITE PRODucTIoN CONTROL PLAN art. VII (C).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1709-3(12) (f) (Purdon Supp. 1952).
65. See text at note 27 upra.
66. See text at note 30 supra.
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at a loss were then making a profit 07 The Senator named three companies
and said that a great many others would not be operating were it not for
production control. He predicted that many collieries would reopen if the
trend toward stabilization continued.68
Table IV shows that prices jumped in January 1940 to $9.50 per ton
from $9.15 in December 1939, perhaps in anticipation of the Plan, which
became effective January 30, 1940. The average price for the uncontrolled
year of 1939 was $9.14 while for the controlled year of 1940 it was $9.55.
These published prices do not indicate the even greater fluctuations at
tidewater markets.69 The schedule of bituminous prices, for which mini-
mums were set under federal regulation," shows a decline of $0.01 from
1939 to 1940. The general war boom, which could be expected to affect
bituminous, an industrial fuel, more than anthracite, largely a domestic
fuel, did not occur in the coal industry until 1941.71 Thus the Anthracite
Production Control Plan was probably instrumental in raising prices in
1940.
TABLE IV
MONTHLY ANTHRACITE PRICES
Wholesale-Composite-Chest-ut-Dollars per ton
j F M A M J j A S 0 N D
1939 9.73 9.69 9.64 9.07 9.15 9.14 8.66 8.60 8.64 9.03 9.16 9.15
1940 9.50 9.58 9.58 9.39 9.28 9.33 9.46 9.56 9.64 9.77 9.78 9.79
1941 9.83 9.83 9.81 9.81 9.79 9.81 9.95 10.10 10.25 10.30 10.30 10.29
YEARLY AVERAGES
1930 11.35 1933 10.06 1936 9.74 1939 9.14
1931 11.40 1934 9.64 1937 9.37 1940 9.55
1932 10.88 1935 9.59 1938 9.45 1941 10.01
MONTHLY BITUMINOUS PRICES
Wholesale-Composite-Mine Run-Dollars Per Net Ton
J F M A M j J A S 0 N D
1939 4.29 4.28 4.28 4.42 4.46 4.24 4.24 4.24 4.22 4.33 4.33 4.32
'1940 4.32 4.31 4.29 4.27 4.26 4.26 4.25 4.25 4.27 4.40 4.39 4.39
1941 4.36 4.36 4.36 4.37 4.54 4.57 4.62 4.67 4.69 4.70 4.71 4.70
YEARLY AVERAGES
1930 3.90 1933 3.66 1936 4.27 1939 4.31
1931 3.73 1934 4.13 1937 4.29 1940 4.30
1932 3.63 1935 4.24 1938 4.32 1941 4.56
from Standard and Poor, Trade and Securities 180 (1949) and Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Wholesale Prices (June and Dec. 1939).
67. He noted that there had been ten companies in three counties which had
suffered bankruptcies during the period before the institution of controls. According
to the Senator, from the inauguration of the plan to the time of the debate in the
legislature (less than sixteen months), not a single bankruptcy had occurred. 24
PA. LEGis. J. 4497 (1941).
68. Id. at 4497-8.
69. GLEN ALDEN COAL Co., 1941 ANNUAL REPORT 1.
70. 50 STAT. 72 (1937) (Bituminouis Coal Act of 1937).
71. PHILADELPHIA AND READING COAL AND IRON Co., 1939 ANNUAL REPORT 10.
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A study of the reports of four of the largest anthracite companies com-
prising about 40% of the industry's production indicates a substantial im-
provement in financial conditions in 1940. The Philadelphia and Reading
Coal and Iron Co., which had been operating at deficits of from $1,000,000
to $4,500,000 for each of the previous four years, achieved a profit of
$747,000 in 1940 72 and admitted that the Plan had been beneficial. 78
The Lehigh Valley Coal Corporation, which had had net operating deficits
of over $1,000,000 for each of the three preceding years, in 1940 enjoyed
a profit of $265,000 while sales and production dropped.7 4 It ascribed to
the Anthracite Plan "a satisfactory measure of success." 7i The Lehigh
Coal and Navigation Co., which had had deficits of from $500,000 to
$1,500,000 (before general and administrative expenses) for the preceding
four years, enjoyed a profit (before the same expenses) of $151,000 for
1940 while production and tons sold declined.76 The Glen Alden Coal Co.,
which had operating income of $1,200,000 to $2,600,000 for each of the
three preceding years, enjoyed operating income of $4,900,000 in 1940
while tons mined and tons sold each declined about 7% from the preceding
year.77 That company reported: "Much of the improvement in operating
results can be attributed to this Program for while published prices were
generally the same as in 1939, price-cutting was less severe and published
prices were more nearly realized." 78 Thus, in the first year of the Plan
three of the four companies increased their net income substantially while
their sales and production declined. The fourth profited for the first time
in five years. The first indication that the World War II boom had hit
the industry did not appear until 1941.79 Indeed, any war boom at this
time would have increased production which for 1940 was 2000 tons less
than for 1939. From the standpoint of the companies, at least, the Plan
has been successful.
TiHE LEGALITY OF THE PLAN
The Plan cannot be seriously challenged under state law, since it was
provided for by the state legislature and since the state courts find no
difficulty ii sustaining the constitutionality of acts of legislature controlling
72. Moony's INDUsTRIALs 1711 (1941).
73. PHILADELPHIA AND READING COAL AND IRON Co., 1939 ANNUAL REPORT
10; 1940 ANNUAL REP RT 10.
74. MooDY's INDUSTRIALS 596 (1941).
75. LEHIGH VALLEY COAL CoRPoRATIoN, 1940 ANNUAL REPoRT 2.
76. MooDY'S INDUSTRIALS 2489 (1941). Lehigh Coal ascribed its 1940 success
to "reduction in royalty and interest payable, lower costs generally, and higher
average income per ton of coal sold." LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION Co., 1940
ANNUAL REPORT 27. In the preceding year "unusual competitive conditions in the
Industry forced prices to extremely low levels." LEHIGH COAL AND NAVIGATION
Co., 1939 ANNUAL REPoRT 29.
77. MooD, s INDUSTRIALS 165 (1941).
78. GLEN ALDEN COAL Co., 1940 ANNUAL REPORT 1.
79. GLEN ALDEN COAL Co., 1941 ANNUAL REPORT 1.
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industries of a large and public nature.80 Whether the Plan is subject to
the jurisdiction of the national government depends on the breadth of the
commerce clause. Although state limitation to daily demand of oilwell pro-
duction which was immediately shipped in interstate commerce was in 1932
held valid as not "part of interstate commerce," 81 in 1942 Wickard v.
Filburn 8 2 extended the federal jurisdiction to production controls having
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. In Wickard the Fed-
eral Government was allowed to limit grain production destined for con-
sumption on the producer's farm on the grounds that farmers' purchasing
or refraining from purchasing extra grain affected the interstate market
price. Since the limitation on coal production has been shown to affect the
interstate market price,83 any coal production control is within the regu-
latory power of the Federal Government.
8 4
Restrictions on interstate commercial activity are controlled by two
different legal sanctions, depending on the source of the restrictions.
Private restraints of trade are subject to anti-trust prosecution.8 5 Burdens
on interstate commerce by a state are subject to the bar of the commerce
clause of the Constitution. The commerce clause is not directly applied
to private restrictions because the Sherman Act is available, but it may be
questioned whether the Sherman Act should not be applied to state action
since the evil economic effects of restraints on commercial activity are no
less severe when perpetrated by a state than when they result from private
action. Nevertheless a state legislature ostensibly represents all of the
strata of society in its domain, and it may be assumed that all have a chance
to voice their opinions in the consideration of legislation.o Because of this
representation, there is justification for requiring a greater degree of inter-
ference with production on the part of a state than on the part of a private
person, before the Federal Government is allowed to intervene. The Su-
preme Court has held in Parker v. Brown 8 7 that the Sherman Act could
80. See, e.g., Scranton v. Public Service Commission, 268 Pa. 192, 110 Atl. 775
(1920) ; Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306 (1894). But cf. Hertz Drivurself v.
Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948).
81. Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
82. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
83. See text following note 68 supra.
84. Cf. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
85. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946) (Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1946),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 17-21 (Supp. 1952) (Clayton Act).
86. Whether this assumption is valid may be judged by perusal of the text at
notes 27 and 41 supra.
87. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). State regulation of prices of commodities, regulation
of which constitutes a per se violation when done by private parties (United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)), has been approved under the
commerce clause by the Supreme Court without reference to the Sherman Act.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also, Cities Service Co. v. Peerless
Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (natural gas). State restrictions on production of
milk for other states have been disapproved under the commerce clause without
reference to the Sherman Act. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) ;
ef. Suni-Citrus Products Co. v. Vincent, 72 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Fla. 1947), (where
state regulation of prices in a patent pool was approved partly under Parker v.
Brown), rev'd on other grounds, 170 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1948).
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not be applied to state regulation of the marketing of raisins on the basis
of market requirements, finding that neither the Sherman Act nor its his-
tory suggest the purpose of restraining a state. The Court distinguished
situations where the state might authorize or become a participant in a
private combination for restraint of trade.88
Whether the Sherman Act applies to the Anthracite Plan, therefore,
depends on whether the Anthracite Plan presents the same-kind of state
action as was present in the Parker case. The Anthracite Plan was in-
augurated by the agreement of Pennsylvania's governor and the United
Mine Workers 89 with the operators. The agreement of the governor did
not bring the Plan within a strict reading of the Parker rule, since the
regulation classified as state action by the Supreme Court in Parker v.
Brown "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command
of the state and was not intended to operate or become effective without
that command." (Emphasis added.) 90 Furthermore, where the legislature
has indicated a conscious choice of policy, as it did here in rejecting a
stricter production control plan, the governor would seem to have no power
to contract with private parties against the legislature's will.9 1 As a result,
the governor's cooperation was insufficient to exclude from the operation
of the Sherman Act a plan which might otherwise have been a violation w
A more difficult question is whether the later intervention of the legislature
took the Plan out of the scope of the Sherman Act. A comparison of the
important aspects of the Plan with the California statute and program con-
sidered in the Parker case will indicate whether the Anthracite Plan derives
its "authority and efficacy from the legislative command of the state" in a
similar manner.
88. Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941); Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 344-7 (1904). The possibility that
the instant plan falls within the doctrines of these cases is discussed in text at note
109 infra.
89. The co-operation of the United Mine Workers may have originally been
obtained at least partly to avoid the Sherman Act since union activities had been
exempted from the operation of that act. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1941). In 1945, however, the Supreme Court held that a union's participation in
a combination of businesmen to eliminate competition could not obviate the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797
(1945).
90. 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
91. Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal. 498, 105 Pac. 593 (1909); cf. Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the President took possession of
and managed the steel companies because of an emergency despite the fact that
Congress had consciously rejected the use of such methods in the Labor Management
Relations Act.
92. Whether the plan would violate the Sherman Act without the State's par-
ticipation is discussed infra. See text at note 111 infra. As to legality of the Plan
by the governor's action alone, compare 63 STAT. 391 (1949), 70 U.S.C. §488
(Supp. 1952). Application of anti-trust laws to buyers of government property of
a value of over $1,000,000 cannot be prevented by the rendering of an unfavorable
advisory opinion to the General Services Administration by the Attorney General
as to whether the disposition would create a situation inconsistent with the anti-
trust laws.
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The California system 98 allows the inauguration of marketing controls
for various agricultural commodities if 65% of the producers and the
owners of 51% of the producing acreage approve;14 controls are enforced
against all producers by penal sanctions 95 and can be terminated only by
expiration or on the application of 40% of the producers and the owners
of 40% of the acreage.96 The Anthracite Plan had to be approved by 75%
of the tonnage of the industry, and since it is voluntary, it sets up no re-
quirements for withdrawal. In each case the inauguration of the controls
has been left to the industry; the California statute imposes more control
by reason of penal sanctions until the 40% withdrawal requirement is met.
However, state control is necessary to eliminate any Sherman Act problem
only where there are restraints of commerce on monopolizing, and in Penn-
sylvania 100% of those who limit their production are controlled by the
state, which has a veto power over their quotas. Those who do not co-
operate are not in restraint of trade and therefore do not need state control.
The California statute requires before a plan is approved that it be shown
that it will not result in unreasonable profits to the producer,97 thus safe-
guarding prices to the consumer; whereas such a safeguard is lacking in
Pennsylvania where no consumers are represented in the determination of
the quotas. Part of this difference is explicable by the fact that the
Anthracite Plan was directed at a single, obviously depressed industry
whereas the California statute is applicable to many commodities, and a
finding of instability in the commodity intended to be regulated must be
made before regulation can be imposed.
98
Under the California statute, and the raisin plan in particular, produc-
tion was not controlled, but the state undertook to market 70% of the crop
and to make loans.9 9 In Pennsylvania each producer is limited in the
amount he can mine. Thus in California sales and financing are controlled
whereas in Pennsylvania the Plan sets a figure for production. These are,
however, only two different means of restricting supply at the source.
Regarding standards of regulation, California explicitly requires that mar-
keting be adjusted to market demand '0 0 while the Pennsylvania statute
requires production be regulated for four different and conflicting pur-
poses.10 1 In actual operation the Pennsylvania plan does in all probability,
however, limit itself to market demand.10 2
The most significant and determining kind of state control is in the
administration of both plans. The California statute requires that the plan
93. CAL. GEN. LAws act 143a (Deering 1944).
94. Id. § 16.
95. Id. § 22.5. There is also provision for civil liability. Id. § 25.
96. Id. § 23.
97. Id. § 10(6).
98. Id. § 10(2).
99. Id. § 19.1(c), § 26.
100. Id. § 19.1 (e).
101. See text at note 59 supra.
102. See text following note 61 supra.
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be approved by an Advisory Commission of nine; six producers, one con-
sumer representative, one "handler," and the Director of Agriculture. 0 3
This Commission also approves the Director's selection of a program com-
mittee nominated and drawn from the producers; 104 the program commit-
tee formulates the marketing programs subject to commission approval 0 5
and administers the prorate program subject to the approval of the Director
of Agriculture.100 The Anthracite Plan is administered by nine men, with
the governor, labor and industry each appointing three. Seven are needed
to approve any motion or quota. Furthermore, the governor can abolish
the Plan at any time.1O7 Each plan, therefore, has the state government in
control with a veto power over the immediate administration of the plan.
If state action consists of control by elected representatives, each plan is
equally state action. Questions of voluntariness, consumer representation
and state handling of the product would seem less significant than the fact
that the Plan was passed by the legislature and that the elected governor
of Pennsylvania can veto all regulation through his appointees. In addi-
tion, the legislature is presented with a report each year; if it became dis-
satisfied, the legislature could, of course, abandon the Plan entirely.
The possibility that the instant Plan might be excluded from the state
action category as expounded by Parker v. Brown must be considered. The
question here is whether the state has become a participant in a private
combination for restraint of trade so as to include the combination in the
purview of the federal anti-trust acts. The two cases distinguished by the
Court in Parker involved defenses by corporations: that a state had granted
the corporate charter and therefore the defendant corporation was immune
to anti-trust prosecution; 108 and that a city rather than defendant railroad
granted subsidies to businesses to assume leases in defendant's new ter-
minal, 0 9 therefore rendering defendant immune. But in the former case,
it was held that the corporate charter could not be interpreted to authorize
the subsequent development of restraint of trade; in the latter case, that the
subsidies were authorized not by a state but by Kansas City, which is a far
less representative unit, and scarcely represented the interests of other
103. CAL. GEN. LAws act 143a, § 3 (Deering 1944).
104. Id. § 15.
105. Ibid.
106. Id. § 22.
107. See note 43 supra.
108. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-7 (1904);
cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). (A state
fair trade statute, which bound nonsigner retailers to the prices of contracts made
between producers and other retailers purportedly under the Miller-Tydings exemp-
tion to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946) was held to be not within the exemp-
tion which applied only to signers. The argument that a state is not subject to the
Sherman Act was not dealt with by the Court, but could have been distinguished
on the grounds that the state failed to regulate prices under the contracts as well
as on the stated grounds that Congress did not intend to cover nonsigners by the
Miller-Tydings Act.)
109. Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941). The statute
construed was the Mann-Elkins Act prohibiting rebates by carriers to shippers.
32 STAT. 823, 847-8 (1903), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §41-5 (1946).
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railroads.1 0  Moreover, subsidies, which were initiated if not paid by
defendant, discriminated against other railroads which served the city area.
In neither case was there any state administration of a continuing program.
Furthermore, in the Anthracite Plan the state has approved the very prac-
tices carried on and no provisions discriminatory against any producers
exist. In fact, producers who do not take part in the plan probably benefit
most since they have the advantage of price increases resulting from the
limited production of the members, without restricting their own output.
Should the Anthracite Plan by reason of its private origin be con-
sidered not state action within the scope of Parker, the fact that from 80
to 85% of the industry "cooperates" in the Plan might well make it illegal
as a monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,-" particularly since its
control of production affects prices. 112 Under Section 1, a combination to
control production for the purpose of controlling supply or prices on an
interstate market is an illegal restraint of trade. 13 Clearly the Anthracite
Plan has no other purpose than to control supply and thereby stabilize
prices.
On the other hand, during the depression, Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States 1-4 upheld under sections 1 and 2 the creation of a unified
sales agency of 74% of the bituminous coal producers in the Southern High
Volatile Bituminous Field despite a "stabilizing" effect on prices. This
holding was basically on the theory that the agency would still be faced with
effective competition from coal outside the agency. A contributing reason
was the recognition of competition in the broader market of coal and coal
substitutes; such a competition and market is likewise present in the
anthracite situation; in fact it is the very cause of anthracite's precarious
situation. Under the "rule of reason" as developed in Appalachian 115 the
Plan might be legal without state action, but that case indicates that there
was no control of production. And furthermore, recent cases cast doubt on
the continuing validity of Appalachian. Judge Learned Hand has indicated
that the Appalachian case has been discredited." 0B "It is settled, at least as
110. The other railroads had their principal terminal in Kansas City, Missouri,
across the river. "But the promotion of civic advancement may not be used as a
cloak to screen the granting of discriminatory advantages to shippers." Union
Pacific R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450, 465 (1941).
111. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (in which Judge Hand designated 90% control as a clear monopoly).
112. Id. at 424.
113. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); Coronado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); American Column and
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); cf. United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (where private companies continued buying
"distress" gasoline to support the market price as had once been authorized under
the NRA) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1931) ; see also
HANDLER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
114. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
115. Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) ; Board
of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
116. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945) citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-4 (1940).
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to § 1, that there are some contracts [referring to price-fixing] restricting,
competition which are unlawful, no matter how beneficent they may be; no
industrial exigency will justify them; they are absolutely forbidden." 117
Assuming, however, that the Anthracite Plan is state action on the
basis of the veto power belonging to the three state representatives on the
Anthracite Committee, the question remains whether the state action is
valid under a direct application of the commerce clause. In 1932, Clmplin
Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission 11s held that state regulation of
production of oil destined out of state was not regulation of interstate
commerce, but the distinction there drawn between manufacture or produc-
tion of a commodity and the subsequent interstate transportation of it was
maintained only as an alternative holding in Parker v. Brown in 1943,119
and has been discarded when raised as a defense to federal regulation.'-'
Since 69.94% of anthracite was shipped out of Pennsylvania in 1951-52,121
control of anthracite production must at least be regulation affecting inter-
state commerce.
Nevertheless, states may, in the absence of conflicting federal regula-
tion, regulate that part of interstate commerce which is peculiarly adapted
to local regulation and diversity of treatment. 1 22  If the regulation dis-
criminates against interstate commerce, it will be invalid; 123 if it only
burdens interstate commerce without giving intrastate commerce a greater
advantage, the Court's usual approach has been to balance the competing
interests of nation and state.' 24  The Anthracite Plan burdens interstate
commerce by raising the price of coal to the consumer, but since the price
is no different for the out of state consumer than for the Pennsylvania con-
sumer, there is no discrimination; therefore, it is a matter of weighing the
competing state and national interests. Parker v. Brown held that the
prorationing of the raisin crop to stabilize the market was "peculiarly
within the province of the state" despite the fact that it raised interstate
prices and curtailed interstate shipments (95% of the crop was consumed
117. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (unconditionally
condemning contracts fixing prices).
118. 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
119. 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943), 41 MICH. L. REV. 968 (1943). Cf. Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (municipal ordinance requiring all
milk sold in Madison to be pasturized within five miles of the city held unconstitu-
tional) ; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (statute requiring all shrimp
boats fishing in South Carolina waters to dock in South Carolina held unconstitu-
tional).
120. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
121. ANTHRACITE INSTITUTE, MANUAL OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION Table 16
(1953).
122. California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); Cooley v. Board of Port
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
123. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
124. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) ; Southern Pacific R.R. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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elsewhere).125 Thus, the state interest prevailed in a situation very similar
to the Anthracite Plan. However, Parker is distinguishable from the
Anthracite Plan on several grounds. In California production itself was
not limited and there also existed at the national level similar programs
which embodied provision for cooperation with the states by federal au-
thorities.126 Under the California statute at least some consideration is
given to the out of state consumer interest by denying excessive profits
to the producers. 2 7 The fact remains, however, that Parker did find the
production and marketing problems to be local.
What the Court overlooked in Parker and what is even truer in Penn-
sylvania is that the consumers of raisins and coal respectively, are not in
fact represented in the state legislatures. The most significant fact is
that 69.94% of the consumers of anthracite are not represented in the Penn-
sylvania legislature, while over 95% of anthracite production is. Even if
the consumers had been 100% opposed to the Plan, they could not have
easily protected themselves. Consumers are never able to organize so
effectively as the labor and management lobbies, a fact indicated by the fail-
ure of a single legislator to oppose passage of the amendment to the Com-
merce Law of Pennsylvania which authorized the Plan. The Plan itself
was not open to question by any consumer groups at least until its ratifica-
tion by the Pennsylvania legislature, which was more than a year after it
was put into effect. Unless the Supreme Court is willing to declare state
acts of this type unconstitutional, the way is opened to industries located pre-
dominantly in one state to obtain legislative permission for regulation which
would otherwise violate the Sherman Act. On the other hand, if all state
acts which affect citizens of other states are invalid, little is left to a state's
regulation of its economic affairs. But if the national economic policy is
to encourage competition, abrogation of that policy should be allowed only
when all interested parties have at least the possibility of being repre-
sented substantially in proportion to their numbers. Present law as mani-
fested by the Parker case seems only to prevent the states from giving
blanket unsupervised permission to restrict competition, or from dis-
criminating among private concerns.
The weakness of the Pennsylvania statute and the Anthracite Plan in
not strictly limiting the authority of the Anthracite Committee to the right
to set production at demand has already been shown.12S It is clear that
the Plan was devised by the operators and union to support a declining
industry and lessen the severity of competition. It was put into effect by a
state governor without legislative approval eight months after the legislature
had rejected a more stringent plan; the legislature approved a system which
had been in operation for fifteen months and which without legislative
125. 317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943).
126. 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U.S.C. §608c (1946) (Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937) ; 52 STAT. 31 (1938), 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1946) (Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938).
127. CAL. GEN. LAWs act 143a, § 10(6) (Deering 1944).
128. See text at note 59 supra.
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approval would have been of dubious legality.1 29 When consumers are as ill-
represented as they were in the passage, structure, and operation of this
Act, it would seem that the Parker doctrine should not be applied.130
Whether or not state-wide production control is the best method of reviving
a declining industry in terms of the industry's economic situation is another
matter.
ALTERNATIVES AND EVALUATION
There is no doubt that the anthracite industry is a sick one. The ques-
tion is what economic policy is best to save, or "stabilize," that industry
if, indeed, it should be saved. Several suggested policies will be outlined:
production control, the present system; unrestricted price competition,
similar to pre-production plan conditions; private ownership under one
corporation; '13 regulation as a public utility; 
13 2 and public ownership.1 33
These alternatives must be evaluated not only from the standpoint of
benefit to the industry but also with reference to national economic and
legal considerations.
The Production Plan.-Interviews with individuals taking part in the
Plan disclose that a number of advantages have been gained as a result
of the production controls. Employment in the stricken communities in-
creased, although, even with the Plan, the industry continues to decline.
1'
Mine safety standards are raised because operators do not have to cut costs
to the bone and because there are fewer unemployed miners forced to boot-
leg on their own without adhering to state safety regulations. Quality may
be increased because pressure of low prices is not so great. Conservation
is promoted because higher prices reduce the necessity to mine only the
most accessible coal and leave the rest.13 5 The Plan provides protection for
the capital investment of each company, which is especially important where
the investment is in mines which are less convertible to different uses than
are factories. Finally, the mines are kept open in case of a national emer-
129. See text following note 111 supra.
130. See Southern Pacific R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) in which Mr.
Chief Justice Stone speaking for the Court said, "In applying this rule [that the
states do not have authority to impede interstate commerce] the Court has often
recognized that to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests
outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political
restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are affected." Id. at
767 n.2 .
131. Glenn 0. Kidd, now president of Lehigh-Navigation Coal Co., speech to
joint meeting of Greater Philadelphia Fuel Conference and Philadelphia Coal Club,
March 11, 1953.
132. See report of the Anthracite Coal Industry Commission, May 15, 1937, 21
PA. LEGIS. 3. 7918 (1937).
133. Ibid.
134. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Nov. 19, 1953, p. 4, col. 5; ANTHRACIE
CoM rTTEE, REPORT TO rME GENERAL AssEioLY OF COMION --ALTH OF PA. (June 18,
1953) ; Hard Times in Hard Coal Country, Busnmxss WFEIC Mar. 22, 1952, p. 108.
135. Report of the Anthracite Coal Industry Commission, 21 PA. LEGIs. J.
7917 (1937).
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gency; 336 reopening a closed mine to meet emergency demands would be
complicated both by the labor problem and by the difficulty of removing
accumulated water.
Because of geological upheavals and faults, mining in the Southern and
West Middle fields is more costly and less adaptable to mechanization than
the Northern and East Middle fields.18 7  Therefore, should it be desirable
for the above reasons to keep all of the mines operating, protection by con-
trols is a principal method to allow these naturally higher cost operations
to continue. Furthermore, in a declining industry such as anthracite, free
competition tends to be unusually severe as each company fights to retain
its market. This has a tendency to cause losses as in 1938 and 1939 until
enough operators discontinue to allow prices to rise again. Criticism of the
Plan on the grounds that it raises prices is partially met by the fact that
competitive fuels prevent too great an exploitation of this opportunity.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the Plan is that it retards business fail-
ures, preventing severe economic and human dislocations. The Plan's
validity under the Sherman Act and the problems of burdening interstate
commerce have already been demonstrated.
Unrestricted Competition.-Competition has always been the instru-
ment of free enterprise for the regulation of price and investment. Cut-
throat competition (where even the most efficient producers operate at a
loss) means only that too much is being produced; marginal producers who
cannot meet price and quality standards are eliminated. Traditionally, the
function of investors has been to absorb this shock, just as they reap the
profits when production is below demand. That the investor made a mis-
take in investing is no reason to preserve him. It must be acknowledged
that there is a danger that mines of a responsible producer driven out by
competition will be reopened by an operator who will compete on the basis
of costs reduced by the payment of non-union wages, by sacrifice of the
quality of his product and the safety of his miners and by mining only the
coal easiest to mine. Any achievement of price competition must, there-
fore, be accompanied by strict maintenance or improvement of the present
quality controls (which the operators themselves initiated) and safety
standards.
When production is artificially limited costs and prices both increase.:1 8
Limiting production to demand guarantees the high cost producer a market
136. Further description of the problems of coal mining and the benefits of
stabilization may be found in H.R. REP. No. 1800, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935);
H.R. REP. No. 294, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) ; SEN. REP. No. 252, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) ; Hearings before subcommittee of Committee on Ways and Means on
H.R. 8479, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; Hearings before subcommittee of Committee
on Interstate Commerce on S. 1417, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
137. EVAN, ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE OF THE ANTHRACITE INDUSTRY (unpub-
lished thesis in U. of Pa. Library, 1950).
138. See text at note 69 supra. The magnifying effect, of production control
on costs of production is evidenced by the protests of management when the United
Mine Workers were controlling production in the bituminous industry in 1949 by
means of three day work weeks; industry representatives testified that such produc-
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at the expense of the consumer. Higher prices mean more switching to oil
and gas for heating. The most efficient way to compete with oil and gas
is to drive out the high cost producers by unlimited competition and to
enable the remaining operators and reorganized companies to receive the
benefits of lower costs through mass production and full-time utilization of
investment. Probably this would result in a certain concentration of owner-
ship, but concentration would be great only if very large producers proved
more efficient than small ones. 3 9
A serious problem might be created by the unemployment of miners
whose employers were forced by competition to close. Bootlegging would,
as a result, also be encouraged, but this kind of unemployment, analogous
to technological unemployment, should receive a positive social treatment
by government other than subsidizing the mines. The money now spent
by consumers in higher prices, supporting these extra miners, should be
devoted to greater consumption in other areas, thus creating new jobs
elsewhere and obtaining more goods. The fact that it is very difficult for
a state to take this long range view only emphasizes the necessity for
national rather than local control. 40
The pressure of price competition would be somewhat detrimental to
conservation in encouraging the waste of hard-to-get coal, but anthracite
coal conservation is unlike oil or even bituminous conservation. Under
present property law it pays each oil well owner to pump as much as he
can to obtain more than the adjoining well owners drawing from the same
field.1 41 Hard coal, unlike bituminous, can be stored for some time. The
threat to conservation in the anthracite industry arises from a pressure
to close the mine after mining the coal easiest to extract, leaving the timbers
to rot and the mine to cave in. This pressure is present today, although
not so severe as during a period of real competition when high cost pro-
ducers are being driven out. It would seem that the savings to society
from lower prices are more important than possible expenditures in re-
opening mines, should a new rise in demand ever necessitate it. That
rise may never occur.
tion control created inefficiency, that full production was necessary to support the
high capital investment, to promote mechanization, and that greater costs were
incurred because the efficiencies of mass production were prevented. It would appear
that the effect of production control on costs would not differ because the coal was
anthracite rather than bituminous. Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency on Economic Power of Unions, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Idle
but open anthracite mines incur costs from ventilation, pumping, safety inspections,
and other maintenance operations which account for perhaps as much as one fifth
of the retail anthracite price or $75,000,000 per year. Glenn 0. Kidd, speech to the
New Jersey Coal Dealers Association, February 26, 1953.
139. See FTC, RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF BUSINESS (TNEC Monograph 13,
1941).
140. Compare the provisions under the Schuman Plan for reemployment with
the aid of the High Authority of workers who lose their jobs through dislocations
caused by the sudden creation of a free international market. TREATY CONSTITUTING
THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, CONVENTION CONTAINING THE
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS § 23 (1951).
141. See RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 17, 43 (1948).
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Basically, the anthracite industry is not much different from any other
in the effects of price competition on capital, labor, and quality of product.
If free enterprise as protected by the Sherman Act is to remain our national
economic policy, the Parker doctrine should be rejected for anthracite in
order to reassert competition as the regulator of price and investment.
Present deficits in some parts of the industry reflect the inept use of in-
vested resources necessitated by production control.'42 Regulation in ex-
cluding competition from some areas too often neglects to make controls
coextensive with the areas excluded.'1  If restriction of competition in
production and prices is allowed, then public interest demands regulation
of the other economic incidents of the industry.
If real competition in anthracite is not to be allowed, there may be
justification for other industries to demand production "stabilization" as a
solution for their economic problems. In view of the experience with cartels
in Germany between the World Wars, where permission to form voluntary
cartels gradually developed into power to compel membership, permission
once granted threatens to become private economic government without
any competition.'" There is little doubt that a return to real competition
in the anthracite industry would be the alternative closest to the national
policy expressed in the Sherman Act.
Private Monopoly: The Other Extreme.-Competitioni in anthracite,
as in all industries, has some wasteful aspects. Recognizing this fact, a
leading spokesman of the anthracite industry has suggested consolidation
into one large private company with the cooperation of the federal and state
governments. 145 Not only could high cost operations, which function to-
day under the protection of production control, be closed in favor of full
time production from low cost mines, but competitive sales promotion could
be cut 80%, resulting in a $12,000,000 annual saving to the industry.
1 46
Assuming that such a saving would be used to benefit the consumer, a
single-corporation plan might appear to be a good one; but it is highly
unlikely that the consumer would gain any advantage from a private
monopoly without some form of guarantee through public regulation.
Public Utility.-If resort were had to a single anthracite corpora-
tion, the consumer interest could be maintained by making such an organiza-
tion a public utility.147 Utility controls are the usual form of comprehensive
regulation, particularly where it is necessary to promote conservation,
142. E.g., Mines were worked on an average of four days per week in 1950.
ANTHRACITE INSTITUTE, MANUAL OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION Table 10 (1953).
143. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 377-8 (1951).
144. Kronstein, Cartel Control-A Record of Failure, 55 YALE L.J. 297 (1946).
For the methods of cartelization utilized in European economies, see DErARTMENT
OF STATE, FOREIGN LEGISLATION CONCERNING MONOPOLY AND CARTELS (1952).
145. Glenn 0. Kidd, speech to joint meetings of Greater Philadelphia Fuel Con-
ference and Philadelphia Coal Club, March 11, 1953.
146. Ibid.
147. See note 132 supra.
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safety, and national defense (assuming this to be the case with anthracite).
Public utility controls lessen the importance of the function of the investor
to absorb losses. His right to profits correspondingly decreases. The con-
sumer, of course, gains by regulation of price and investment.
The public utility, however, is usually characterized by its performance
of a service in which competition is prohibitively wasteful by reason of
duplication in investment. Anthracite does not seem to be analogous in
this respect to normal utilities. Furthermore, utility regulation has ordi-
narily been imposed where the service involved is clearly necessary to the
public welfare. That this is doubtful in the case of anthracite is witnessed
by the growing replacement of anthracite by other fuels.14s An additional
fact to be considered is that the delays encountered by utilities in changing
rates and investment might be difficult for an industry which normally
resppnds to market situations more rapidly and to a much greater extent
than do other utilities.
The fact that anthracite is dissimilar in many respects to some concepts
of public utilities, however, should not preclude possible adaptations to
meet the industry's situation. Even without consolidation into a single
company, anthracite price regulation could be carried out in a manner
similar to existing milk price regulation.1 49
Public Ownership.-Since the above alternatives, with the exception
of unrestricted competition, would lessen the risks of competition to the
investor, his function may be so reduced in a declining industry, which
needs less risk capital, as to warrant purchase by a public corporation. This
could effect the economies of full utilization of investment and elimination
of duplication while adjusting the interests of low prices, conservation,
safety and national defense. National ownership in the United States is
subject, however, to varied economic and political obstacles. Moreover, a
single corporation, public or private, would eliminate any of the possible
economies from the small scale operations of free competition. 150 Besides
the political and economic difficulties in public ownership, the legal limita-
tions upon such a scheme have not as yet been adequately defined. 151
The five alternatives have been considered in the light of the history
of decline in the anthracite industry since 1917. There are some indica-
tions, however, that coal, generally, will be increasingly used as an indus-
trial fuel in the future; the development of new uses for coal is also a
factor. Estimates foresee a rise in production of about 60%o from 1950 to
1975.152 It is quite possible that anthracite, as well as bituminous, may be
148. See Table II supra. But cf. note 152 infra.
149. See Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 247 (1937),
7 U.S.C. §608c (1946).
150. See FTC, RELATivE EFFICrENCY OF BusNEss (TNEC Monograph 13,
1941).
151. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Atomic Energy Act, 60
STAT. 755, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-19 (1946).
152. 1 PRESIDENT'S MATERIALS POLICY COmmiZSSION, REsouRcEs FOR FREEDO M
115 (1952). See also WOYTINSKY AND WOYTINSKY, WORLD POPULATION AND PRo-
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expected to share in the increased consumption. These considerations may
compel future re-evaluation of the desirability of the five alternatives. In
an expanding market there is no justification for production control. With
increased consumption would come a need for risk capital, which can best
be attracted under competitive conditions; in addition, the wastefulness
of duplication in free enterprise would be minimized although not eliminated.
CONCLUSION
Since 1910 the operators have lost three anti-trust prosecutions. 53
Whether the anti-trust policy ever succeeded in restoring competition for
any length of time may well be questioned. Substantial doubt is' cast on
the ability of private enterprise to operate the anthracite industry com-
petitively. As soon as real competition occurred, the industry succeeded
in persuading a governor to promulgate a control plan which his legislature
had in effect rejected eight months previously. Fifteen months later pro-
duction control became legal when industry and union persuaded the state
legislature to enact the Plan. The existence and application of the doctrine
of Parker v. Brown does not merely represent a threat to the standard of
living by increasing costs. It threatens democratic government by en-
couraging industry to seek abrogation of the Sherman Act by state legis-
latures without consideration of consumer interests. The ability of the
anthracite industry to prevent unfavorable legislation, to obtain executive
action when the legislature rejects action, and finally to obtain the enact-
ment of its own program has been shown. Seldom is the translation of
private economic power into political power so manifest.
DUCTION (1953). "The use of fuels extracted in liquid and gaseous form from the
earth's crust will probably . . . approach its completion by the end of this century.
The era of coal, which began 150 years earlier, is likely to continue longer . .
Excerpt quoted in Time, Nov. 30, 1953, p. 95, col. 3.
153. Two suits have resulted in convictions. United States v. Reading Co.,
226 U.S. 324 (1912); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); in the
third the defendants pleaded nolo contendere. United States v. Glen Alden Coal
Co., Criminal No. 113-391, S.D.N.Y. (pleas of nolo contendere entered May 2,
1944).
